a supply system for spare parts, and works with defense contractors on developing new systems.
The case study focuses on a recent experience, during which commanders George T. Babbitt, Jr. and Lester Lyles dramatically transformed management practices at AFMC along lines broadly consistent with the generic practice of responsibility budgeting and accounting. Babbitt divided the command's missions and responsibilities into seven categories called "businesses". The business included research and development, testing and evaluation, supply, and distribution. Seven of the commander's direct reports within AFMC headquarters were designated as "chief operating officers (COO's)". The commander told the COO's that they were responsible for the efficiency and effectiveness of their respective businesses. He described AFMC, in internal and external fora, as resembling a multi-business, divisionalized corporation. More literally, Babbitt had set up an adhocracy structure (Mintzberg 1983) requiring mutual adjustment between the COO's within the headquarters and commanders of nearly two dozen installations around the country.
As part of the planning process, quantitative targets were established on a businessby-business basis; these targets included financial results, including unit cost levels.
For purposes of planning and control, accounting measures were devised and the corresponding information-handling routines put into operation. The commander reviewed measured performance on a business-by-business and quarter-by-quarter basis for purposes of control and evaluation.
This configuration of organizing arrangements and flows of activity describes a specific design for practicing responsibility budgeting and accounting. The concrete practices and skills required for this design to function effectively in the AFMC context emerged through a series of progressively challenging phases of experience.
6
The design of this organizational learning process, as well as the interactive performances of numerous participants, was decisive to the workability of the generic practice of responsibility budgeting and accounting in the AFMC context. Such process designs and interactive performances are success factors for implementation of responsibility budgeting and accounting, at least in the U.S. context.
Why Manage Costs?
When George Babbitt readied himself to assume command in May 1997, AFMC was at risk. In order to fund ambitious modernization programs within a regime of level defense spending, the Air Force's long-term strategy called for winnowing so-called infrastructure costs. Within this scheme for arguing about resource priorities, much of AFMC's activities were cast as infrastructure. Babbitt understood that the prospective budget-cutting pressures would be difficult to resist given AFMC's long troubled relationship with the rest of the Air Force, especially headquarters-level officials involved in resourcing (programming and budgeting) decision-making. A major irritant in this relationship was recurring deficits in the Air Force working capital accounts through which AFMC's supply and maintenance activities were operated financially. When it came time to initiate execution of the Air Force's budget at the outset of a fiscal year, top programming and financial management staff at Air Force headquarters faced the consequences of the previous year's excess of spending over revenues in the working capital accounts. Under law, such past financial losses needed to be recouped by a contribution from the current year's funding. Therefore, the budget execution cycle began by having to find ways to reduce spending relative to what had been planned and agreed with all of the Air Force's major commands. Given these recurring irritants and the perception of infrastructure cost reduction as a source of modernization funding, Babbitt 
Defining Products and Establishing Base-Line Costs
The initial assignment handed to each chief operating officer was to develop a "work breakdown structure" for his or her business area and to present it to the executive team within six weeks. This concept -a tool of project management -was part of the active vocabulary of parts of the command. Applied to modeling a business area, a work breakdown structure provides a hierarchically ordered taxonomy of products and services. As the presentations took place, vast disparities in such constructs became apparent. Some chief operating officers were beginning to work out taxonomies that lent themselves to quantifying the volumes and unit costs of their businesses' products or services. Just as many did not. In nearly every instance, Babbitt asked the chief operating officer to bring an improved construct back to the same forum for discussion within a few weeks. Within six months of assuming command, many of the elements of George Babbitt's intervention were in place. Around command headquarters at WrightPatterson, the whole vocabulary of businesses, chief operating officers, outputs, and costs was becoming more familiar. Babbitt had come to style a rhetoric of "managing costs," which he contrasted with the dominant paradigm of "managing budgets."
Field commanders were exposed to the new lexicon and its associated practices at quarterly Commander's conferences. Meanwhile, Babbitt considered his next move.
Turning the Programming Process Inside Out
On the horizon was a major cycle of medium-range planning and budgeting In the run-up to the programming cycle, Babbitt let it be widely known that AFMC would be "giving money back to the Air Force." Less colloquially, he meant that AFMC would submit a program that requested less total obligational authority than had previously been programmed. AFMC would, in effect, volunteer to reduce its spending authority compared to what had been agreed as an outcome of the previous programming cycles. This message was communicated internally and externally, and it amounted to an open pledge given to Babbitt's four-star colleagues, including the chief of staff and the heads of the other major commands.
Second, Babbitt told his own headquarters and field units that the AFMC program would not be built as before. Within the command, the process was no longer to revolve around justifying adjustments to the base-line spending figures. These figures, from Babbitt's standpoint, were of no relevance to the programming process, considered as an exercise in performance planning. For purposes of performance planning, a main question was how much unit costs could be progressively reduced relative to their historical base line, without degrading effectiveness in meeting user requirements. Consequently, chief operating officers were required to present a program that specified a time-path of unit costs at the business and product levels over a six year period, beginning two years ahead. In doing so, they were expected to consult with the field commands. Yet it was evident to all concerned that their common superior would be displeased if the program did not incorporate steadily decreasing unit costs.
Building a program "bottom-up" from unit cost and surrendering previously agreed future spending levels without a bureaucratic struggle violated a deeply ingrained script in Air Force programming practices. One field commander was known to have told his own staff, "I thought I had been invited to the Mad Hatter's tea party." But the process design for developing AFMC's program submission was coherent with two strategic directions: first, making cost management an organizational competence and, second, forestalling a vicious cycle of budget custs and performance shortfalls.
A responsibility of the programming and financial management staff at headquarters was to make sure that planned reductions in unit cost would generate, overall, a significant net reduction in planned spending, relative to the base-line established by previous rounds of programming. A huge technical and presentational 13 problem was that the accounting structure underlying the Air Force's programming and budgeting systems had nothing to do with AFMC's businesses, outputs, and unit costs. The command's program obviously had to make sense to the Pentagon.
Translating from one account structure to the other was a nightmarish task for the programming staff at AFMC headquarters.
In the event, they succeeded. The program submitted to Air Force headquarters proposed trimming spending relative to the base line by $2.7 billion. This reduction went significantly beyond expectations couched in programming guidance that Air 
Keeping the Program from Unraveling up the Line
Before the programming cycle began in earnest at Air Force headquarters, Babbitt traveled back to the Pentagon to brief his submission. The senior general officers in the room warmly welcomed the surprising news that AFMC would be coming in with a significant decrease in requested budget authority, not least because all the other major commands were coming in with programs that substantially exceeded their own fiscal guidance.
While Babbitt's approach was a god-send for the most senior officials at Air
Force headquarters, everyone knew that final programming decisions were substantially based on recommendations made by less senior officials participating in the process. In many situations, these working-level programmers would be blind to the effects of their actions on the AFMC's plans to lower unit costs. In one envisioned scenario, a proposed increase in spending in one budget account would be evident to one group of programmers, while the savings in another account would be evident to a different group. The first group could reject the proposed increase in spending, while the second group would naturally accept the proposed decrease. In that event, business plans for decreasing unit costs would be undone and AFMC would be stuck with an unsustainable budget cut.
Anticipating this palpable risk, the colonel in charge of programming at AFMC, Mark Borkowski, headed to the Pentagon: "We had to go to the Air Force and say, 'We built our program bottom up, based on products and unit cost, and then we loaded money into budget accounts. You need to understand that our program is all interweaved and interlocked.' That's where we got in trouble. The mid-level programmers working in the Air Staff thought we were gaming them." However,
Borkowski relied on Babbitt's authority to press the case with them and their superiors.
In time, word came down that the Air Staff programmers needed to check with Dayton before making changes. According to Borkowski, "This message was interpreted as saying 'you can't mess with the AMFC program.'" As Babbitt recalls the episode, "The Air Staff tended to say, 'OK, even though we don't understand completely why they asked for money in these areas, we are going to bless AFMC's program and allow it to go up to Department of Defense the way they submitted it.
And we'll spend our time working with the other commands that asked for billions of dollars more than was in their fiscal guidance.' This response got us over an important hump." Apart from demonstrating external support for Babbitt's approach, this event instituted, at least temporarily, a form of top-line budgeting for AFMC. What it achieved for AFMC and its mangers was considerable fiscal flexibility. and run our businesses. This was true not only for us at headquarters but also at the centers. Every three months operating officers were forced to review the status of 'their' business areas, especially with respect to variances from planned activity, spending, and unit costs. You have to force busy people to do this. Otherwise, they will be totally caught up in day-to-day activities."
This was also a sharp break with past practice. AFMC's division of authority and responsibility had traditionally distinguished between fiscal functions, which were the duty of financial managers, and service delivery functions, which were the duty of operating managers. The job of operating managers, to the extent that it had a fiscal aspect, had been defined in terms of getting and spending money. In contrast, Babbitt now expected operating managers to ask for less and where possible to use even less than they were allocated. At the same time, he refused to tell his subordinates how to manage costs or even how much to cut them. He believed that to do so would be contrary to the cultural norms he sought to instill throughout AFMC. Many of Babbitt's operating managers, especially the field-unit commanders, could not at first understand what Babbitt wanted of them when invited to debate and dialogue about their costs -or why. Consequently, they grumbled: "Why won't he just tell us how much he wants to cut our budget? Why is he wasting our time with this stuff?" 6 Babbitt persevered, however. He believed that the quarterly execution review was the best chance he had to teach cost management, promote managerial learning, and infuse the cost management culture throughout the organization, thereby establishing a basis for sustained performance improvement.
Management Control: Getting Costs Right
At the end of Babbitt's first year, AFMC's cost analysts could allocate about 80 percent of AFMC's 1996 outlays to products. To improve the quality and utility of unit cost estimates, AFMC's financial management community embarked on a crash program to extend AFMC's legacy job-order cost accounting system to business areas that lacked direct-cost systems. In depot maintenance and supply management, the two areas with the greatest experience with product costing, they went further, replacing AFMC's old job order cost system with a modern flexible costmeasurement system. would find out what you got. Now, we have a much more collegial process, where each of us has an opportunity to brief, explain, justify our needs and our budgets to each other and to hear the needs and budgets of our counterparts. This is a better process. It leads to greater self-discipline but it has also given us a better understanding of where the dollars go and where they are most needed." Another difference is that "we commanders, rather than our CFO's, present our budgets." This means, "we must understand everything in our budget; we have to explain it and justify it to our counterparts." Four distinct institutional arrangements and activities influenced organizational performance. First, medium-term expenditure planning (i.e., programming) and management control (i.e., budgeting and execution review) practices created pressure on field organizations to innovate their production practices so that they would become progressively more cost effective. This pressure arose because unit cost targets established in the medium-term expenditure planning process were translated into unit cost targets for years of execution. Given stable routines for budgeting, the level of resources made available in future years reflected unit cost targets, along with projected activity levels. These expectations for resourcing generated pressure to search for more cost-effective routines.
Second, the medium-term expenditure planning practices included a variant of "top-line budgeting," i.e. relative freedom to allocate funds among established program accounts. This prerogative amounted to decentralization from the Air Force to AFMC levels, in the first instance. Such selective decentralization eliminated a host of potential constraints (more specifically, the need to negotiate a phenomenally large number of linked change requests) in the course of implementing innovations in production practices.
Third, AFMC was organized along business lines, for purposes of performing the functions of medium-term expenditure planning and management control. Each business area was constituted as an accounting entity, in terms of which budgets were constructed and costs (and other performance information) were reported.
Responsibility for each business area was nominally assigned to a single individual, called the business's chief operating officer. These roles were given particular responsibility for performing the functions of medium-term expenditure planning and management control. Fourth, AFMC had developed a management control practice of monitoring business performance in the year of execution. This practice provided a role for the AFMC commander to exert pressure on his various subordinates, including business chief operating officers and field commanders, to undertake any necessary corrective actions to achieve the desired (and usually planned) level of performance.
AFMC's practices, however, diverged from the generic practice of responsibility budgeting and accounting in a major organizational respect. The generic practice involves a type of organizational design known as the divisionalized structure (Mintzberg 1983) . In this structure, authority and responsibility for business planning, operations, and financial accomplishments are delegated to positions comprising the organization's "middle line." In Mintzberg's terms, AFMC's organizational design was an adhocracy, rather than a divisionalized structure.
AFMC's headquarters was organized by business area, while the field was organized geographically (as it had always been). Both chief operating officers and field commanders reported to the AFMC commander. From a structural standpoint, aside from the head of the science and technology labs (Duffner, 2000) , the only literal general manager at AFMC was the commander himself, a situation Babbitt tolerated because reorganizing the line organizations would have consumed undue time and attention.
Babbitt sought to compensate for the difficulties of this second-best structural design by participating directly and intensely in such processes as programming and quarterly execution reviews. He also used his institutional power to make the most of the adhocracy structure. Babbitt consistently described the chief executives as responsible and accountable for the performance of the command's businesses. At one notable meeting well into the intervention, a clarifying question posed by a field commander was anonymously put to Babbitt: "If a chief operating officer and a field commander cannot come to agreement, who wins?" Babbitt's response was, "if a chief operating officer and field commander have to come to me to decide a matter that they have not managed to resolve, then they both lose." In this way, the commander reinforced the adhocracy structure. At the same time, Babbitt, and later Lyles, was careful to respect conventions that provided subordinate, field commanders with considerable discretion in the use of allocated resources and (other operational issues) once the budget cycle's year of execution began. The structure, while awkward in a military organization, appeared to be workable and practical for purposes of strengthening AFMC's cost management capacity. But this departure from the generic practice placed heavy demands on the commander's time and attention. Ultimately, perhaps, these demands were not viable.
Conclusion
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The generally affirmative tone of this narrative is consistent with two indicators of the intervention's success. First, it has endured and spread. Subsequent AFMC commanders, have largely endorsed Babbitt's approach and the experience has promoted significant changes in the Air Force-level resource allocation process.
Moreover, under Babbitt's successor, General Lester Lyles, the sophistication of the command's unit-cost based budgeting and accounting system has continued to increase. The air staff largely attributes the success of AFMC's units in winning public-private competitions to this factor.
Second, the intervention was successful on its own terms -AFMC cut costs and reconciled with its parent organization. During Babbitt's tenure, the command's budgets were brought into line with its budget guidance, where they have remained ever since; the working-capital funds stopped losing money; and the command executed its budget so as to produce no unwelcome surprises for the corporate Air that, under Babbitt, the performance measurement system was crude at best, but financial outcomes improved; Under Lyles, performance measures were more sophisticated, as arguably was the use of unit costs in the programming process, but fiscal performance worsened. Clearly, better cost-management systems do not guarantee more-effective cost management.
It is, of course, possible that the fiscal achievements of the Babbitt era were unsustainable. Nevertheless, we believe things could have turned out differently had the command's top managers continued to be involved in the quarterly execution review and if Lyles had assigned himself a substantial part in the cost-management dialogue. Ongoing participation in the process of debate about unit costs, corrective actions, and accountability for performance would have helped motivate AFMC's managers to manage costs better and to learn how to do so. At the very least, it is reasonable to conclude that effective cost management requires greater sustained attention and a shorter learning cycle than the annual budget process allows. Even
General Lyles has expressed regret that he failed to play a more active role in this process.
The AFMC story also tells us some things we had not known about responsibility budgeting as an organizational governance mechanism. For example, we knew all along that traditional budgets are spending plans -that they look like recipes, while responsibility budgets look like targets, usually expressed in financial terms. We also knew that responsibility budgeting assigned the process of formulating and executing budgets to general managers. One thing we hadn't appreciated was the degree to which empowering front-line managers to achieve their targets also meant downgrading budget managers and financial analysts.
Both air staff programmers and AFMC's budget analysts lost considerable influence during this episode. Neither group is entirely content with this outcome.
Although for the latter, their transformation from central players to back-office bean counters is consistent with professional norms. Professional accountants follow rules.
They are often highly ambivalent about the influence they win by bending rules to make funds appear where needed or by using misdirection and misinformation to 25 defend budget proposals. In any case, they seem less keen to restore the old regime than are their déclassé counterparts on the air staff.
We also learned that many of AFMC's managers were unprepared to participate fully in the managerial conversations expected of them. Responsibility budgeting's logic of making and letting managers manage presumes they know how. Where cost management is concerned, that is not predictably the case. Mission oriented managers are used to treating budgets as constraints; they are often tyros when it comes to managing costs. Indeed, the upward-oriented skills required to get and manage budgets -the skills that have given government managers their current standing -are not especially pertinent to the tasks of cost and performance management. This fact should caution even the proponents of responsibility budgeting against easy, happy assessments of its workability. Moreover, responsibility budgeting assigns a decisive role to mid-level general managers. There were almost no general managers at the AFMC before Babbitt's intervention, at least not at the middle line. This is regularly the case in government.
Consequently, we conclude that AFMC's efforts under General Babbitt were surprisingly effective in developing the organizational competence to manage costs, given the institutional context, where national budgets are spending plans and obligational accounting practices are the norm. We attribute this outcome more to the proficient design of the process by which AFMC came to develop its practices and capacities of cost management than to any other thing. 1. In general, something is practical where the means are available to put it into operation; it is workable only where it will remedy a problem or deficiency (Simons 2001: 159) .
Endnotes
2.
The data collection methods for this paper include direct observation, review of archival materials, and semi-structured interviews. Direct observation occurred during the period between September 1997 and August 1998, when the authors served as paid advisers to the AFMC commander and participated regularly in executive council meetings, commanders conferences, and private meetings with General Babbitt and other AFMC officials.
3. See the attached "Note on Sources" for citation information for quotations included in the text. Where the attached note identifies more than one possible source, the source is specified in a footnote following the text in question.
4.
Babbitt divided AFMC into business areas in much the same way as his predecessors had divided the command into mission areas, which had been overseen by committees of staff officials, although he separated supply and maintenance into different business areas because they operated different working capital funds. Francis McGilvery (1966 McGilvery ( , 1968 proposed a similar structural approach to responsibility accounting and budgeting for military organizations.
5.
Of course, unprecedented as these practices seemed to many of AFMC's constituents, they were by no means original to Babbitt. Unit-cost based budget formulation was proposed by the controller's shop in the defense secretary's office at the beginning of the 1990s (Juola 1993) and even earlier in the performance budget proposals of the 1950s (Roberts 1964) . Trading spending authority for greater operating and fiscal flexibility is a ubiquitous and time-honored budgetary stratagem (Thompson 1993) . Of course, we don't mean that AFMC was granted absolute fiscal flexibility. It still had to comply with explicit legislative guidance -but its front-line managers were generally free to decide the means to achieve their unit-cost targets.
6. Borkowski, El Segundo, California, February 2003.
This accounting-information system was developed at the Indian Point Naval
Station for the Navy's stock management and industrial activities. As an ecumenical gesture, its developers renamed what had been the Naval-Air Industrial Financial Management System the Defense Industrial Financial Management System (DIFMS) when AFMC adopted it. Babbitt had wanted a commercial product instead. However, based on considerations of feasibility, practicality, and timeliness, AFMC's financial managers insisted on a more incremental accounting-information systems strategy. They believed they had an honest shot at implementing DIFMS by 1999 and argued that getting the knowledge, resources (financial and material), and waivers required to carry out more fundamental data base/information systems development and implementation efforts would delay implementation of a workable accountinginformation system by three to four years at best and, if needed resources and waivers, were not forthcoming, indefinitely. Babbitt swiftly weighed the 28 alternatives and authorized AFMC's financial managers to go ahead with DIFMS, a hybrid accounting-information system with features of both older, more rigid, fixed format and newer, more-open, relational data bases.
Compared with then existing legacy systems, DIFMS promised greater inventory control and real-time cost visibility, enhanced responsiveness to customers, and more complete direct-cost measurement.
8. Most informed observers agree that the defense department's working capital funds suffer from two conceptual failures. The first is pricing on an average total cost basis, which often leads their customers to perform services for themselves rather than buying them from the working capital funds where that would be less costly for the department as a whole. The best solution to this problem is probably some form of multi-part pricing, where the customer pays a lump sum for the right to be served and variable cost for the service itself (Keating & Gates 2002; Thompson 1991) . The second problem derives from the notion that these funds are supposed to break even rather than earn a notational profit in the execution (as opposed to the expenditure planning) phase of operations. This view seems to reflect the mistaken notion that a notational profit would be earned at the expense of the working capital fund's customers. In fact, notational profits are just like the working capital funds' notational losses, the latter become must-pay bills for the department as a whole, the former represent obligational authority that could be reallocated to other high priority purposes. Unfortunately, avoiding notational profits often results in avoidable outlays and sometimes losses, see (Thompson & Jones 1994 ).
